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Recent Decisions
Therefore, it is submitted the two approaches cannot be deemed con-
sistent unless the risk fragmentation analysis is in part a guise for the
determining of scope of liability problems on more than a simple
application of its elements. The court may utilize a Thorton approach
or simply affirm a jury determination on a strong factual pattern in
a case involving "unforseeable consequences". However, this serves as
a bypass to the sometimes difficult question of where do we cut off
negligence. A considered evaluation of numerous factors, including
those mentioned above, applied through a general class of harms,
would increase judicial integrity and certainty when facing this type
of problem. The alternative of risk fragmentation leaves us simply
with the statement that this hazard is unforeseeable.
The use of risk fragmentation is consistent with Pennsylvania's ap-
proach to this type of problem, but if the court utilizes it to foreclose
liability simply on the basis of foreseeability, then it must be pre-
sumed that any accident resulting from highly unusual circumstances
presents a very difficult problem to the plaintiff. If correctly applied
the process will result in a finding of no liability in the majority of
such cases. Therefore, the rational in Metts must be understood for
exactly what it is-a seemingly innocent process whereby potential
liability may be effectively foreclosed at a very early stage in the negli-
gence formula. It also provides a vehicle, or a guise, for resolving the
difficult scope of liability problem on less than the full consideration
of factors necessary, and at a minimum, may block the resolution of
other issues which might more rationally dispose of the case.
I. Stephen Kreglow
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-VOID FOR VAGUENESS-POLITICAL DEMONSTRA-
TION-In reversing a conviction based on the desecration of an Ameri-
can flag, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held the term "politi-
cal demonstration" be given a broad interpretation.
Commonwealth v. Haugh, 439 Pa. 212, 266 A.2d 657 (1970).
Appellant-defendant Haugh was convicted in the Philadelphia Com-
mon Pleas Criminal Court of violating the Pennsylvania flag desecra-
tion statute which makes it a misdemeanor to publicly desecrate or
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defile any flag of the United States except while participating in any
patriotic or political demonstration.' The judgment was affirmed by
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2 but reversed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and the defendant discharged.
Haugh, while participating in a rally at Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, protesting U.S. involvement in Vietnam, was arrested while
carrying a United States flag on which were printed the words "Make
Love Not War" and "The New American Revolutionaries." The basis
of appeal was the constitutionality of the Act of June 24, 1939 and its
alleged abridgement of the First Amendment right of free speech. The
court, however, did not reach that question but instead held that defen-
dant was acting in a political demonstration and was excepted from
conviction under the Act. The holding thus rejected the lower court's
proposal that the word "political" pertains only "to the exercise of the
functions vested in those charged with the conduct of government
and relates to the management of governmental affairs." 3 It instead,
adopted the dissenting opinion of the superior court holding that the
term "political demonstration" cannot be so narrowly construed.4
The courts have had the difficult task of determining the judicial
significance of demonstrations and how such acts may fit into the
scheme of constitutionally protected rights of both the demonstrators
and non-demonstrators. The legislators of Pennsylvania have seen fit
to exempt from prosecution those who desecrate or defile the American
flag while exercising their right of symbolic free speech during a politi-
cal demonstration. However, they have failed to designate what that
term includes. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hoffman, of the Super-
ior Court of Pennsylvania, relies on a definition of the word "political"
noted in the case of State ex rel. Maley v. Civic Action Committee.5
That court defined the word as follows: "Of or pertaining to the exer-
cise of the rights or privileges or the influence by which the individuals
1. Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, as amended, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4211
(Supp. 1970). The Act provides in part: "Whoever, in any manner, places . . . any word
... upon any flag of the United States ... or publicly casts contempt either by word of
acts upon, any such flag ... is guilty of a misdemeanor ... This section does not apply to
any patriotic or political demonstration or decorations."
2. 215 Pa. Super. 160, 256 A.2d 874 (1969).
3. Id. at 165-166.
4. Id. at 166. Judge Hoffman dissents: "Any common sense definition of political
demonstration must include demonstration by the people in support of political action
which they favor. This would include action by political parties, by veteran's groups, by
welfare and civil rights groups, by police and fire and fraternal organizations as well as
groups opposing American foreign policy."
5. 238 Iowa 85, 28 N.W.2d 467 (1947).
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of a state seek to determine or control its public policy; having to do
with the organization or action of individuals, parties or interests that
seek to control the appointment or action of those who manage the
affairs of a state. ' 6 A narrower interpretation of "political activities"
was espoused in Lockheed Aircraft Corporation v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County7 which involved a section of the California Labor
Code8 prohibiting employers from regulating the political activities of
employees. The court stated that the words politics and political imply
orderly conduct of government and not revolution. The Lockheed
definition of "political" however, does not concern itself with the
generic nature of the term "political activities" but only with its rele-
vance in regard to control and direction by employers.
The word "demonstration" was interpreted by the Supreme Court
of Georgia in the case of Herndon v. State,9 when it upheld a refusal
by the lower court to charge the jury that there was a wide difference
between "demonstration" and "insurrection." The appellant in Hem-
don contended unsuccessfully that a "demonstration" is "the public
exhibition of one's sympathy towards a social or political movement;"
"insurrection" is "resistance with force against the lawful authority of
the state...."10 Webster defines the word "demonstration" as "a
public display of group feelings (as approval, sympathy, or antagonism)
especially toward a person, cause or action of public interest."'"
A landmark case in the area of flag desecration was Street v. New
York. 12 Street, after hearing of the rumored death of civil rights leader
James Meredith by sniper in Mississippi, carried a 48 star American flag
to a near by intersection, lit it with a match, and dropped it on the
pavement. Street was soon arrested and charged with violating a New
York flag desecration statute."x The United States Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded a conviction holding that words alone could not be
enough to sustain a conviction. The Court stated that a violation both
by words and actions without indicating which was the basis for con-
viction was unacceptable. 4 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Fortas
6. Id. at 471.
7. 28 Cal.2d 481, 171 P.2d 21,24 (1946).
8. WEST'S CAL. LABOR CODE § 1101 (West 1955).
9. 178 Ga. 832, 174 S.E. 597 (1934).
10. Id. at 608.
11. WEBsTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 600 (3rd ed. 1961).
12. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
13. NEW YoR GEN. Bus. LAW § 136, par.d (McKinney 1968) makes it a misdemeanor:
. .publicly [to] multilate, deface, defile or defy, trample upon, cast contempt upon
either by words or act [any flag of the United States]."
14. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 at 528-529 (1945).
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found that the act of burning an American flag on a crowded street
could not be excused simply because it was done for political reasons.
"Protest," stated the Justice, "does not exonerate lawlessness.' 15 The
Court, Mr. Chief Justice Warren pointed out, did not concern itself
with the constitutionality of a statute forbidding desecration of an
American flag in protest. Nor was the nature and extent of a demon-
stration, political or otherwise, determined. 16
The line of precedent which attempts to define "political demonstra-
tion" is at best nebulous and far from conclusive. It would seem, as
was contended by the appellee in Haugh, that if a broad definition 17 of
the term "political demonstration" were accepted, the scope of activi-
ties falling within this category would be limitless. Justice Roberts,
speaking for the court, touches on the problem by stating: "If the
demonstration involved here was not 'political', it would then become
extremely difficult to say what demonstrations are, or are not, political.
The line between demonstrations at which appellant's conduct could
be punished, and demonstrations at which it could not, would be so
vague and uncertain as to be a matter for guess work."' 8 It is submitted
that the majority opinion has not clarified where this "line" must be
drawn but has only broadened the area of permissible demonstrations.
Here, by way of dictum, the court has avoided the most relevant issue-
whether or not the term "political demonstration" as used in the Act
of 1939 is too vague for application.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently used the "Void
for Vagueness Doctrine" to strike down penal statutes which use broad
and uncertain terminology.'9 In Stromberg v. California20 a female
of the Young Communist League instructed children to salute a red flag
at a summer camp in which she was employed. She was convicted of
violating section 403(a) of the Penal Code of California which pro-
hibited the display of the red flag "as a sign or symbol or emblem of
opposition to organized government .... 21 The Court held the statute
void for being vague and indefinite in that it could punish those who
would peacefully protest the government by legal means and within
15. 394 U.S. 576, 617 (1969).
16. Id. at 594-605.
17. See note 4.
18. 439 Pa. 212, 266 A.2d 657, 659 (1970).
19. See generally Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CoarEm L.
REV. 195 (1955). Cf. Amsterdam, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine In The Supreme Court,
109 U. PENN. L. REV. 67 (1960).
20. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
21. Id. at 533.
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constitutional limitations. The similarity between the terms "opposi-
tion to organized government . . ." and "political demonstration" is
too obvious to ignore.
In Herndon v. Lowry22 the United States Supreme Court held un-
constitutional and void for vagueness section 56 of the Penal Code of
Georgia which punished any attempt to incite others to join in "any
combined resistance to the lawful authority of the state." 23 The Court
declared the statute to be too uncertain. It did not furnish a sufficiently
ascertainable standard of guilt. The broad terms struck down by the
Court seem closely akin to the phrase "political demonstration."
The case of Connally v. Grand Construction Co.24 developed the
test used most commonly today in determining whether a statute is or
is not void for vagueness. It stated: "a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process. '"25
It is submitted that the court in Haugh v. Commonwealth, in its
attempt to avoid the vagueness doctrine, has left Pennsylvania with
a statute virtually unmanageable in its broad scope. It has the effect
of making the legislative act a dead letter since all a defendant need
do in the future is indicate that his actions were politically motivated.
It is not contended that the actions of appellant Haugh were not po-
litical in nature. However, the court has failed to give the slightest
guideline as to how this statute may be interpreted in subsequent cases.
In effect, it has tossed back to the lower courts an issue equally as
nebulous as before, which still requires "that men of common intelli-
gence guess at it and differ as to its application." As precedent seems
to indicate, such a statute, qualified in broad, uncertain terms must
be held void for vagueness.
Robert W. McClure
22. 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
23. Id. at 246.
24. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
25. Id. at 391.
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